This general criterion is that any action is wrong to which one ought to attach sanctions. But imposing sanctions is a kind of action, and we can ask whether the imposition of a particular sanction would be right or wrong. The general criterion implies that we should answer this question about the rightness of applying sanctions in sanction-utilitarians terms, namely, by asking whether it would be right to sanction the failure to apply sanctions.
This introduces a second-order sanction, whose rightness we can now ask about.
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We seem to be off on an infinite regress of sanctions. Sanction-utilitarianism avoids the regress because it provides a direct utilitarian answer to the question when to apply the first-order sanction. It says that a sanction should be applied iff doing so is optimal. Though this avoids a regress, it appears to render sanction utilitarianism internally inconsistent. In his central exposition of the utilitarian standard in Chapter II, Mill commits himself to act utilitarianism in multiple passages.
In that same chapter, he focuses on the felicific tendencies of actions and assigns a significant role to rules within moral reasoning, both of which have been taken to commit him to a rule utilitarian doctrine. However, these claims are reconcilable with direct utilitarianism and so provide no good reason to depart from a traditional act utilitarian reading of that chapter. But in Chapter V Mill does introduce indirect utilitarian ideas in the doctrine of sanction utilitarianism.
Mill claims that the utilitarian must claim that happiness is the one and only thing desirable in itself IV 2.
An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy
He claims that the only proof of desirability is desire and proceeds to argue that happiness is the one and only thing desired. He then turns to defend the claim that happiness is the only thing desirable in itself, by arguing that apparent counterexamples e. These objections seem so serious and so obvious that they should make us wonder if there is a more plausible interpretation of his proof. For one thing, Mill need not confuse desire and desirability. He recognizes that they are distinct, but says that desire is our only proof of desirability IV 3.
In saying this, he need not presuppose that desiring something confers value on obtaining it. Our desires often reflect value judgments we make, explicitly or implicitly. If so, our desires will be evidence of what we regard as valuable, and our reflectively acceptable desires may provide our best defeasible test of what things are objectively valuable. Mill first applies this test to what each of us desires for her own sake. His answer is that what each of us desires for her own sake is happiness IV 3.
Rather, he is saying when each of us does focus on her own ends or sake, we find that each cares about her own happiness. But we need not suppose that Mill is attributing a psychology, much less an egoist psychology, to humanity as a group. On this reading, Mill is not trying to derive utilitarianism from egoism see Hall Rather, he is assuming that the moral point of view is impartial in a way that prudence is not. Indeed, later, in Chapter V, Mill identifies impartiality and its progressive demands with both justice and morality.
It [impartiality] is involved in the very meaning of Utility, or the Greatest-Happiness Principle.
The equal claim of everybody to happiness in the estimation of the moralist and the legislator involves an equal claim to all the means of happiness …. And hence all social inequalities which have ceased to be considered expedient, assume the character not of simple inexpediency, but of injustice.
The entire history of social improvement has been a series of transitions, by which one custom or institution after another, from being supposed a primary necessity of social existence, has passed into the rank of universally stigmatized injustice and tyranny. So it has been with the distinctions of slaves and freemen, nobles and serfs, patricians and plebeians; and so it will be, and in part already is, with the aristocracies of colour, race, and sex. Here we see Mill identifying utilitarian impartiality with the demands of justice and morality itself also see Crisp 79— One might wonder if utilitarianism is the only or the best way to understand impartiality.
Indeed, this is one way of understanding now familiar worries about the implications of utilitarianism for issues of distributive justice and individual rights. Mill recognizes a potential worry about the sanctions of utilitarianism that apparently has its source in prudence or self-interest.
He [an agent] says to himself, I feel that I am bound not to rob or murder, betray or deceive; but why am I bound to promote the general happiness? If my own happiness lies in something else, why may I not give that the preference?
III 1. For this reason, Mill seems to think that it poses no special problem for utilitarianism III 1, 2, 3, 6. Is Mill right that there is no special threat to utilitarianism here?
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One might wonder whether utilitarianism makes greater demands on agents than other moral theories. Contemporary writers have argued that utilitarianism seems to be potentially very demanding, much more so than commonsense morality. For instance, reformist utilitarians, such as Peter Singer , have argued that utilitarianism entails extensive duties of mutual aid that would call for significant changes in the lifestyles of all those who are even moderately well off.
And critics of utilitarianism have treated the demandingness of utilitarianism as one of its principal flaws. Rawls has argued that the sort of interpersonal sacrifice that utilitarianism requires violates the strains of commitment in a well-ordered society. And Bernard Williams has argued that the demandingness of utilitarianism threatens the sort of personal projects and partial relationships that help give our lives meaning.
This worry about the demands of utilitarianism is not easy to assess.
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One might wonder how to interpret and whether to accept the psychological realist constraint. If the constraint is relative to possible or ideal psychology, then it is not clear that even a highly revisionary moral theory need flout the constraint. Then there is a question about how demanding or revisionary utilitarianism actually is.
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Mill and Sidgwick thought that our knowledge of others and our causal powers to do good were limited to those near and dear and other associates with whom we have regular contact, with the result that as individuals we do better overall by focusing our energies and actions on associates of one kind or another, rather than the world at large U II 19; Sidgwick, Methods — On this view, utilitarianism can accommodate the sort of special obligations and personal concerns to which the critics of utilitarianism appeal. But it is arguable that even if this sort of utilitarian accommodation was tenable in nineteenth century Britain, technological development and globalization have rendered utilitarian demands more revisionary.
Our information about others and our causal reach are not limited as they once were. So even if Mill was right to think that the motivational demands of utilitarianism were not so different from those of other moral theories at the time he wrote, that claim might need to be reassessed today.ed4fr.top/the-complete-aliens-omnibus-volume-two.php
An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy by James Steuart
He begins by distinguishing old and new threats to liberty. The old threat to liberty is found in traditional societies in which there is rule by one a monarchy or a few an aristocracy. Though one could be worried about restrictions on liberty by benevolent monarchs or aristocrats, the traditional worry is that when rulers are politically unaccountable to the governed they will rule in their own interests, rather than the interests of the governed. In particular, they will restrict the liberties of their subjects in ways that benefit themselves, rather than the ruled.
It was these traditional threats to liberty that the democratic reforms of the Philosophical Radicals were meant to address. But Mill thinks that these traditional threats to liberty are not the only ones to worry about. He makes clear that democracies contain their own threats to liberty—this is the tyranny, not of the one or the few, but of the majority OL I 1—5. Mill sets out to articulate the principles that should regulate how governments and societies, whether democratic or not, can restrict individual liberties I 6.
The object of this essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
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His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise.
To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to someone else.
The only part of the conduct of anyone for which he is amenable to society is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence, is, of right, absolute.